The nature and scope of new government electronic surveillance programs in the aftermath of September 11 have presented acute constitutional questions about executive authority, the Fourth Amendment, and the separation of powers. But legal challenges to these new surveillance programs have been stymied—and deci- sions on the merits of core constitutional questions avoided—by court rulings that the challengers lack standing to sue under the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Laird v. Tatum. Last year, Congress amended the law governing foreign intelli- gence surveillance; the law has been challenged in court, and once again the issue of the challengers’ standing is at the heart of the case.

In light of the fundamental civil liberties and separation of powers questions that remain unanswered, it is vital to identify who, if anyone, has standing to challenge government surveillance. Unfortunately, the law of standing in the sur- veillance context remains murky and in important respects appears out of line with the larger body of standing jurisprudence. In some case