There is a short-sightedness in this article (Afghans will pay the price for a man hellbent on victory, 3 November) that seems to think the story started with this election and fails to respond to the larger patterns at play. Hamid Karzai was implanted initially by the US in the lead-up to the formation of a new government in 2001. He was meant to raise an enthusiastic resistance to the Taliban and march on Kabul. He could not, and had to be airlifted by the US to safety, to be implanted later. He was widely regarded as a stooge. Many friends of mine joined his government, recognising his position as the best of a series of less attractive options. But as time passed, Karzai's position became politically untenable with the Afghan people. US atrocities undermined his ability to be free-standing, and gradually he started to become less obedient. He began to get some local support for his stands against the foreign forces and political actors, and consolidated a local affection that he hitherto had not had.
As Karzai's disobedience to the diktats of his erstwhile