I would like to be an abolitionist also, and I think I have some pretty good reasons for wanting to do so, to think that way, to consider myself an abolitionist.
Moral status is for many ethicists independent of the claimant’s social position in the ‘hierarchy’ (phylogenic scale, in this case) or their role in socially constructing ethical theory. In other words, moral status is not a private social product; it’s public to the extent that it is widely accorded the belief that it’s morally true (in some meaningful sense).
In other words, to claim that nonhumans ought not to be brutalized is somehow believed to be a morally true statement, and the place and status of the ‘ought’ will be thought to be correct. Is ‘ought’ indicative of a duty that is ‘owed’ to the claimants (in this case, those for whom the claim is made)? Yes.
To claims that animals ought NOT to be brutalized is further qualified by ‘in science’ or ‘in the name of science’.
There are at times qualifiers which modify the ‘ought’ (as in ‘just war’ theories), and I do NOT believe that science qualif ...Read the full article