I have been reading through David Kilcullen's testimony to House Armed Services Committee on COIN in Pakistan (.pdf). Studying the past few years, one could arrive at the conclusion that Pakistan's army is epically incompetent. One could similarly arrive at the conclusion that Pakistan's army is competent -- but fighting for the other side. The evidence for both theses is strong. Some lowlights of the Pakistani Army's recent history, provided from Kilcullen's testimony last Thursday:
The 2004 Shakai agreement, where the Pakistani army surrendered to militant demands after losing a campaign in Waziristan, and negotiated directly with Pakistani Taliban leaders, empowering them over local community leaders and ceding control of parts of Waziristan to them.
The subsequent takeover by Pakistani Taliban of large portions of the FATA, the Malakand Division, the Northern Areas, and parts of Baluchistan.
The September 2006 North Waziristan agreement, which again was signed directly between militants and the military (after another failed campaign), and led to a seasonall